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ACCESS TO COURT CASES FROM THE SUPREME COURT’S
2020–2021 TERM: THE NEW MAJORITY’S DEBUT
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& SARAH GRUSIN****
ABSTRACT
Throughout the Supreme Court’s first term without Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, the Court issued only a few major opinions with respect to access to
the Court for civil litigants, and it issued none that discarded major precedents.
Yet, in several areas, the Court demonstrated an increasingly conservative bent
and began to lay the groundwork for major changes. In this Article, we discuss
selected opinions from the Court’s 2020–2021 term that may have an impact on
access to the courts for individuals seeking to vindicate civil and constitutional
rights. In particular, it focuses on cases that may affect access for low-income
and marginalized people. These opinions show the work of a Court in transition
and foretell major changes to come.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s 2020–2021 term marked the beginning of a new era
for the Court. When it convened in October, only eight justices heard
arguments. 1 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg died on September 18, 2020, leaving
her seat vacant for the first time since 1993. 2 After one month, Justice Amy
Coney Barrett joined the Court. 3 The recent additions of Justices Neil Gorsuch
and Brett Kavanaugh, both in their fifties, had already reinforced the Court’s 5–
4 conservative majority. 4 The replacement of Ginsburg, arguably the leading
liberal jurist of the last three decades, with the young, conservative Barrett
cemented a deeply conservative majority on the Court for years to come—one
with the potential to remake the law on a wide range of issues. 5
Even so, the first term of this new 6–3 majority resulted in only a few major
opinions with respect to access to the Court for civil litigants and none that
discarded major precedents. Yet, in several areas, the Court demonstrated an
increasingly conservative bent and began to lay the groundwork for major
changes. 6 Some cases addressing standing, statutory interpretation, and
administrative procedures evidenced a restrictive view of the enforcement of
individual statutory rights and the ability to bring class actions. 7 In contrast, the
Court showed particular interest in First Amendment Free Exercise Clause
claims and special solicitude for individuals asserting those rights against

1. Steven R. Smith, A Pandemic Term with “Highly Charged Issues”: The U.S. Supreme
Court 2020-2021, 47 J. HEALTH SERV. PSYCH. 207, 207 (2021).
2. Nina Totenberg, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Champion of Gender Equality, Dies at 87,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 18, 2020, 7:28 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/18/100306972/justice
-ruth-bader-ginsburg-champion-of-gender-equality-dies-at-87; Process to Fill the Vacated Seat of
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Process_to_fill_the_vacated
_seat_of_Justice_Ruth_Bader_Ginsburg (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
3. Adam Liptak, Justice Amy Coney Barrett Hears Her First Supreme Court Argument, N.Y.
TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/02/us/politics/amy-coney-barrett-supreme-court.html#
:~:text=the%20main%20story-,Justice%20Amy%20Coney%20Barrett%20Hears%20Her%20
First%20Supreme%20Court%20Argument,prisoner%20held%20in%20abusive%20conditions
(last updated Nov. 26, 2020).
4. ALL. FOR JUST., SUPREME COURT NOMINEE REPORT: FIRST LOOK – BRETT KAVANAUGH
1 (2018).
5. Seung Min Kim, Senate Confirms Barrett to Supreme Court, Cementing Its Conservative
Majority, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law
/senate-court-barrett-trump/2020/10/26/df76c07e-1789-11eb-befb-8864259bd2d8_story.html.
6. Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux & Laura Bronner, The Supreme Court’s Conservative
Revolution Is Already Happening, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 20, 2021, 6:00 AM),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-roberts-court-vs-the-trump-court/; Ian Millhiser, The
Supreme Court Is Drunk on its Own Power, VOX (Sept. 14, 2021, 12:40 PM), https://www.vox
.com/22662906/supreme-court-conservatives-abortion-constitution-roe-wade.
7. David Gunter et al., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46910, THE SUPREME COURT’S OCTOBER
2020 TERM: A REVIEW OF SELECTED MAJOR RULINGS 1, 19, 25 (2021).
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governments. 8 Also notable on the procedural side was the Court’s increasingly
heavy use of the controversial “shadow docket,” in which it issues rulings on an
expedited basis without full argument, briefing, or opinions. 9 In addition, the
Court issued more per curiam opinions with dissents, a practice that also drew
criticism. 10
In this Article, we discuss selected opinions from the Court’s 2020–2021
term that may have an impact on individuals’ access to the courts and their
ability to obtain relief for violations of civil and constitutional rights. In
particular, we focus on cases that may affect access for low-income and
marginalized people. The opinions we discuss address major political questions
including the census apportionment, 11 immigration, 12 and the Affordable Care
Act (ACA), 13 as well as statutory claims under consumer 14 and environmental
protection acts. 15 We also discuss a number of opinions addressing various
claims under the First Amendment, including challenges to restrictions intended
to combat the spread of COVID-19. These opinions show the work of a Court
in transition and hint of big changes to come.
II. STANDING
A number of this term’s opinions dealt with the constitutional standing
requirement. Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits the power of federal
courts to “cases” or “controversies.” 16 Courts may not entertain claims that
assert only generalized grievances, but rather, must find that the party bringing
the claim has a particular stake in the case. 17 To meet Article III’s requirements,
plaintiffs must show (1) injury in fact (2) that is fairly traceable to the
8. Valerie C. Brannon, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10551, SUPREME COURT CONSIDERS
OVERRULING FREE EXERCISE PRECEDENT IN FULTON V. PHILADELPHIA 1 (2020); Fulton v. City of
Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1883 (2021).
9. Barry P. McDonald, This Is the Shadiest Part of the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/03/opinion/supreme-court-shadow-docket.html; see
also Samantha O’Connell, Supreme Court “Shadow Docket” Under Review by U.S. House of
Representatives, A.B.A. (Apr. 14, 2021), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/committees/death
_penalty_representation/publications/project_blog/scotus-shadow-docket-under-review-by-housereps/.
10. Ira P. Robbins, Hiding Behind the Cloak of Invisibility: The Supreme Court and Per
Curiam Opinions, 86 TULANE L. REV. 1197, 1199 (2012); Supreme Court Cases, October Term
2020-2021, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Supreme_Court_cases,_October_term_20202021 (last visited Apr. 10, 2022).
11. Trump v. New York, 141 S. Ct. 534 (2020).
12. Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1478 (2021); Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct.
754, 758 (2021); Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. 2271, 2280 (2021).
13. California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104, 2112 (2021).
14. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2200 (2021).
15. Territory of Guam v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1608, 1611 (2021).
16. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
17. TransUnion LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 2203.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

452

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 15:449

defendant’s conduct, and seek (3) a remedy likely to address that injury. 18 The
standing requirement naturally limits access to federal court for individual
claimants and thus can pose a significant barrier to access to the courts. 19
Split decisions in several standing cases kept plaintiffs and claims out of
court, with potentially profound implications for future claims based on statutory
violations. A case likely to have far-reaching consequences for future litigants
was TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, which addressed claims under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA). 20 The Court considered the first requirement for
standing: injury in fact. The Court reaffirmed its 2016 decision in Spokeo v.
Robins, which held that a statutory violation alone does not automatically satisfy
the injury-in-fact requirement. 21 It then went a step further, holding that risk of
future harm does meet the concreteness requirement for damages claims,
narrowing a path to court left open by Spokeo. 22 The decision also marks a retreat
from the landmark ruling in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife that “Congress has
the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise
to a case or controversy where none existed before” and raises serious questions
about the future viability of many statutory claims. 23
Credit reporting agency TransUnion L.L.C. offered a service that informed
participating businesses whether a consumer’s name potentially matched one on
the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s (OFAC) list of individuals deemed a
threat to national security. 24 If a consumer’s name matched one on the list,
TransUnion placed an alert on their credit report indicating a “potential
match.” 25 TransUnion’s process flagged the credit reports of many people who
were not threats to national security, including plaintiff Sergio Ramirez. 26 Mr.
Ramirez discovered this when he was denied a loan to buy a car because,
according to the salesman, he was on a “terrorist list.” 27 He called TransUnion
to request a credit report. 28 The agency sent him a statutorily required summary
of rights and his credit report, which did not mention the OFAC alert. 29 The next
day, TransUnion sent a second mailing that alerted him to the OFAC notation in
his report, but did not include the summary of rights. 30
18. Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).
19. See Erwin Chemerinsky, What’s Standing After TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 96 N.Y.U.
L. REV. ONLINE 269, 282–83 (2021).
20. TransUnion LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 2200.
21. Id. at 2205.
22. Id. at 2212; id. at 2214, 2222–23 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
23. See Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 278.
24. TransUnion LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 2201.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. TransUnion LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 2201.
30. Id. at 2201–02.
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Mr. Ramirez brought a class action suit against TransUnion, alleging three
violations of the FCRA. 31 First, Ramirez alleged that TransUnion failed to
follow reasonable procedures to ensure the accuracy of information in his credit
file. 32 Second, he alleged that in its first mailing, TransUnion failed to provide
all information in his credit file; specifically, that his name was a potential match
for a name on the OFAC list. 33 Third, he alleged that TransUnion failed to
comply with the requirement to provide a written summary of rights with each
disclosure, because it failed to include the summary of rights with the second
mailing that alerted him to the OFAC match. 34
The parties stipulated to certification of a class that included 8185
consumers who had the OFAC notation in their files and also received mailings
that did not include their statutorily-required summary of rights. 35 They also
stipulated that TransUnion actually disseminated credit reports containing the
OFAC information regarding only 1853 plaintiffs. 36 The remainder of the class
members had OFAC alerts in their credit files but the information was not
disseminated to third parties. 37 The District Court found that the entire class had
standing, and a jury returned a verdict in favor of the class. 38 A divided Ninth
Circuit affirmed the holding on standing and liability, but reduced the amount of
damages awarded. 39
In a 5–4 decision written by Justice Kavanaugh, the Court held that only the
1853 plaintiffs whose credit reports were disseminated to third parties had
suffered an injury sufficient to confer standing. 40 The majority focused on the
requirement that an injury be “concrete.” 41 While an injury need not be tangible
to confer standing, the majority held, intangible injuries resulting from
violations of statutorily created rights must have a close relationship to harms
traditionally recognized as providing a basis for lawsuits, such as reputational
harms. 42 In contrast, while Congress may create a statutory prohibition or
obligation, it may not “simply enact an injury into existence using its lawmaking
power to transform something that is not remotely harmful into something that

31. Id. at 2202.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. TransUnion LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 2202.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 2209. The parties agreed only to consider reports disseminated between January 1,
2011 and July 26, 2011, which was around the time that Mr. Ramirez received his mailings. Id. at
2202.
38. TransUnion LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 2202.
39. Id. (citing Ramirez v. TransUnion LLC, 951 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2020)).
40. Id. at 2199–200.
41. Id. at 2204–05.
42. Id. at 2204 (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 340–41 (2016)).
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is.” 43 Even if Congress has created a statutory right and cause of action, courts
still must determine whether a plaintiff has suffered a concrete harm. 44
Turning to the claim that TransUnion failed to follow reasonable procedures
to assure accurate credit reports, the Court held that the 1853 class members
whose reports were disseminated to third parties suffered a concrete harm
comparable to the tort of defamation. 45 In contrast, the remaining 6332 plaintiffs
did not suffer any injury, even though they were victims of a statutory
violation. 46 The majority reasoned that there is no analog in traditional law
where the existence of inaccurate information, without dissemination, amounts
to concrete harm. 47 “The mere presence of an inaccuracy in an internal credit
file, if it is not disclosed to a third party, causes no concrete harm.” 48
Nor was the majority convinced by the argument that these plaintiffs faced
a risk of future harm that met the concreteness requirement. First, the Court held
that these plaintiffs did not “factually establish a sufficient risk of future harm
to support Article III standing.” 49 Moreover, even if they had, injury caused by
risk of future injury gives rise only to injunctive relief, not damages, which is
the only relief sought in this case. 50
The majority next addressed the claims that TransUnion’s mailings did not
comply with FCRA requirements. 51 Though the failure to provide a complete
credit report and include a summary of rights with that report violated the statute,
the Court held that it caused none of the plaintiffs actual harm. 52 Moreover, it
held that this “formatting violation[]” did not bear a close relationship to a harm
traditionally recognized by common law. 53
Justice Thomas wrote a dissent, joined, in an unusual lineup, by Justices
Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor. 54 The dissent accused the majority of ignoring
history that established “the principle that the violation of an individual right
gives rise to actionable harm was widespread at the founding, in early American
history, and in many modern cases.” 55 Here, each plaintiff showed that
TransUnion violated three separate rights created by the FCRA. 56 But, “despite
43. TransUnion LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 2204–05 (quoting Hagy v. Demers & Adams, 882 F.3d
616, 622 (6th Cir. 2018)).
44. Id. at 2205.
45. Id. at 2209.
46. Id. at 22012–13.
47. Id. at 2209.
48. TransUnion LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 2210.
49. Id. at 2211–12.
50. Id. at 2210.
51. Id. at 2207, 2213.
52. Id. at 2207, 2214.
53. TransUnion LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 2213.
54. Id. at 2214.
55. Id. at 2218–19 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 2218.
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Congress’ judgment that [TransUnion’s] misdeeds deserve redress, the majority
decided that TransUnion’s actions were so insignificant that the Constitution
prevents consumers from vindicating their rights in federal court. The
Constitution does no such thing.” 57 As Justice Thomas wrote, this holding marks
a significant change in the law:
Never before has this Court declared that legal injury is inherently insufficient
to support standing. And never before has this Court declared that legislatures
are constitutionally precluded from creating legal rights enforceable in federal
court if those rights deviate too far from their common-law roots. According to
the majority, courts alone have the power to sift and weigh harms to decide
whether they merit the Federal Judiciary’s attention. In the name of protecting
separation of powers, . . . this Court has relieved the legislature of its power to
create and define rights. 58

Thus, this case raises questions about individuals’ ability not only to raise claims
under the FCRA, but also many other statutes protecting civil rights, due
process, privacy, and the environment, if a court decides those statutes create
rights unique to modern society without clear analogues to the harms historically
recognized in common law. 59
The question of when an injury is sufficiently concrete to give rise to
standing also arose in Trump v. New York, which addressed whether individuals
without lawful immigration status could be excluded from the U.S. census count
and, therefore, disregarded when determining Congressional apportionment. 60
The Court did not reach the ultimate issue in the case, instead finding the
plaintiffs did not have standing. 61 It was one of this term’s several per curiam
opinions with strong, three-justice dissents.
The requirements at issue in this case stem from the U.S. Constitution and
federal law. The Constitution requires that an “enumeration” of the population,
or census, take place every ten years. 62 A federal statute requires the Secretary
of Commerce to take this census and to report to the President the total U.S.
population by state for the apportionment of members of the House of
Representatives. 63 The census also plays a role in allocating federal funds to
States. 64 In July 2020, then-President Trump issued a policy that would exclude
immigrants “not in a lawful status” from the apportionment count. 65 For states

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 2214.
Transunion LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 2221.
See Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 270.
Trump v. New York, 141 S. Ct. 530, 541 (2020).
Id. at 536–37.
Id. at 533 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3).
Id. at 534 (citing 13 U.S.C. § 141(a), (b)).
Id. at 536, 538.
Trump, 141 S. Ct. at 534 (citing 85 Fed. Reg. 44,680 (2020)).
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with many resident non-citizens without legal status, the order had the potential
to reduce the number of federal representatives.
Not surprisingly, several suits challenged the policy, including one by New
York and a number of other states. 66 The plaintiffs argued that it would chill
noncitizens and their families from responding to the census, degrading the
quality of the data, forcing states to divert resources to combat the chilling effect
and, ultimately, affect a range of government activities ranging from
apportionment of representation to federal funding for states. 67 The District
Court found that the policy violated the law governing the census and issued an
injunction prohibiting the Secretary from informing the President of the number
of undocumented people counted in the census. 68
The Government appealed directly to the Supreme Court. 69 While the case
was pending, the census response period ended. 70 In a per curiam opinion, the
Court held that the case did not present a justiciable dispute, citing standing and
ripeness. 71 It held that the case was “riddled with contingencies and speculation
that impeded judicial review,” rendering the states’ claimed injuries
insufficiently concrete or imminent to satisfy the injury in fact requirement. 72
The Court noted that it was not clear exactly how the Executive Branch would
ultimately implement the policy of excluding noncitizens from the
apportionment or that it could feasibly be implemented at all. 73 Moreover, the
Court held that the impact on federal funding to the states was even less certain. 74
In the meantime, “the plaintiffs suffer no concrete harm from the challenged
policy itself, which does not require them to do anything or refrain from doing
anything.” 75 Thus, the Court determined the process should be allowed to play
itself out to see whether any injury actually occurred. 76
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, dissented. The
dissent reasoned that “[u]nder a straightforward application of our precedents,”
the plaintiffs have standing to sue, since the Government did not dispute that the
policy would harm the plaintiff states if implemented and that it intended to
implement the policy immediately if able to do so. 77 Justice Breyer noted that
the policy explicitly stated that its aim was to diminish the “political influence”

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 534.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Trump, 141 S. Ct. at 534.
Id. at 536.
Id. at 535–36.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 536.
Trump, 141 S. Ct. at 536 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Id. at 536.
Id. at 537.
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and “congressional representation” of states in which undocumented immigrants
lived. 78 In addition, the consequence of the policy would be that states lose
federal funding that is distributed on the basis of population. 79 Thus, as “the
Government acknowledges it is working to achieve an allegedly illegal goal, this
Court should not decline to resolve the case simply because the Government
speculates that it might not fully succeed.” 80 Further, the states had demonstrated
“a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result” of the policy’s
operation and “need not await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain
relief.” 81
The case ultimately became moot, as one of President Biden’s first actions
was to formally withdraw the Trump administration policy. 82 Moreover, the
facts of the case are sufficiently idiosyncratic that the opinion may not have
much jurisprudential impact. At the same time, the case is concerning for several
reasons. First, as Justice Breyer observes, it is surprising that the administration
could announce an explicit policy to take a certain action with the intent of
inflicting harm on a plaintiff and, merely because the Court deems it unlikely
that they will fully succeed, its action is insulated from judicial review until after
the harm has occurred. 83 Moreover, the use of a per curiam opinion seems an
inappropriate way to address a high-profile, controversial political issue,
particularly when three justices dissent. 84
The Court addressed the remaining two standing requirements, traceability
and redressability, in other cases. First, California v. Texas, a 7–2 opinion by
Justice Breyer, addressed the most recent challenge to the ACA. 85 Two
individual plaintiffs and several states challenged the constitutionality of the
ACA’s mandate to purchase minimum essential coverage after Congress zeroed
out the penalty. 86 The plaintiffs argued that, with no financial penalty, the
mandate was no longer constitutional as a tax, and because it was inseverable
from the remainder of the statute, the whole Act must fall. 87
The Court concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing because the alleged
injuries were not “fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful
78. Id. at 538.
79. Id. at 540.
80. Trump, 141 S. Ct. at 541.
81. Id. at 538 (internal quotation and citation omitted). The dissenting justices would also have
reached the merits and affirmed the lower courts’ determination that the challenged policy violated
the statute governing the census and apportionment. Id. at 542. Relying on the statute’s text, the
history of its application, and legislative history, the dissent concluded that a person’s immigration
status is irrelevant to the question of whether they reside in a state. Id. at 545.
82. Exec. Order No. 13,986, 86 Fed. Reg. 7015, 7016 (2021).
83. Trump, 141 S. Ct. at 541.
84. See Robbins, supra note 10, at 1201–02.
85. California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104, 2110, 2112 (2021).
86. Id. at 2112.
87. Id.
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conduct.” 88 The Court was careful to limit its analysis to injuries traceable to the
alleged unlawful conduct—specifically, the now-unenforceable mandate to
purchase health coverage. 89 The Court repeatedly explained that standing
analysis must be cabined in this way and rejected several theories of injury based
on harms traceable to “other provisions of the Act.” 90
In evaluating the injuries traceable to the mandate itself, the Court concluded
that neither the individual nor state plaintiffs had met their burden to demonstrate
standing. 91 The Court rejected the individual plaintiffs’ claims because they had
already purchased insurance to comply with the mandate. 92 While the Court
noted that it has historically used different language to describe the threshold for
establishing that enforcement is actual or threatened—e.g., “a realistic danger”
or a “substantial” likelihood—there was no question the individual plaintiffs had
not met this burden: they had “not pointed to any way in which defendants . . .
will act to enforce” the mandate. 93
The Court also considered the individual plaintiffs’ standing from the
perspective of redressability. While the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief from
the effects of other provisions, as to the mandate, they sought only a declaratory
judgment. 94 The Court emphasized that the Declaratory Judgment Act does not
independently provide jurisdiction and that with “no one, and nothing, to
enjoin,” the judicial relief plaintiffs sought would not redress their injuries. 95
Turning to the state plaintiffs, the Court similarly concluded that they had
not satisfied their burden to show that the claimed financial injuries were
traceable to the coverage mandate. 96 The Court explained that plaintiffs always
have the burden to demonstrate standing, but here, the evidentiary requirement
was heightened for two reasons. 97 First, the states’ theory of standing turned on
the actions of independent third parties, where “standing is not precluded, but
. . . is ordinarily substantially more difficult to establish.” 98 The states primarily
relied on declarations from state officials describing various financial costs
incurred due to increased enrollment in Medicaid and state employee health
insurance. 99 The Court dismissed these declarations because most did not make
any connection to the mandate, and those that did make a connection described
88. Id. at 2113 (quoting Daimler-Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006)).
89. See id. at 2116-17; see also id. at 2121 (Thomas, J., concurring).
90. California, 141 S. Ct. at 2119.
91. Id. at 2120.
92. See id. at 2114.
93. Id. at 2114 (quoting Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) and Susan B.
Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 164 (2014)).
94. Id. at 2115.
95. California, 141 S. Ct. at 2115–16.
96. Id. at 2116.
97. Id. at 2117.
98. Id. (internal quotes omitted).
99. Id. at 2118.
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consequences of the mandate when it was still enforceable. 100 With respect to
Medicaid, the Court reasoned that the program “offer[s] . . . many benefits” that
would entice individuals to enroll, even absent a mandate. 101 Thus, “neither logic
nor intuition” supported the argument that the mandate caused the increased
Medicaid enrollment of which the states complained. 102 Accordingly, the states’
evidence did not fall under the line of cases permitting standing based on
evidence “that third parties will likely react in predictable ways.” 103
The Court also found standing in Collins v. Yellen, in an opinion by Justice
Alito, who authored the dissent in California v. Texas. 104 While the opinion in
Collins was joined, at least in part, by six Justices (including several in the
majority for California v. Texas), 105 the language used to define the allegedly
unlawful conduct at issue in Collins appears at first blush to be in tension with
the ACA decision. In Collins, shareholders in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
brought a constitutional challenge to the Housing and Economic Recovery Act
of 2008. 106 The shareholders claimed that the Recovery Act violated the
separation of powers by restricting when the President could remove the director
of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). 107 Lower courts found the
shareholders lacked standing because they “could not trace their injury to the
Recovery Act’s removal restriction.” 108 The Court rejected that reasoning,
stating that “for the purposes of traceability, the relevant inquiry is whether the
plaintiffs’ injury can be traced to the allegedly unlawful conduct of the
defendant, not to the provision of law that is challenged.” 109 The Court described
the “allegedly unlawful conduct” as the director’s actions amending agreements
with Fannie May and Freddie Mac, which cost the shareholders money, “and
because the shareholders’ concrete injury flows directly from that amendment,
the traceability requirement is satisfied.” 110 Because, as it later concluded, the
director’s appointment was allegedly unlawful, and the director participated in
executing the amendment that caused the shareholders’ injuries, the
shareholders satisfied the traceability requirement. 111
As in California v. Texas, the Court’s discussion of remedies in Collins
provided further clarification to its traceability analysis. It explained that where

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

California, 141 S. Ct. at 2118.
Id. at 2117.
Id. at 2118.
Id. at 2117 (quoting Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2566 (2019)).
Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1770 (2021).
Id. at 1769.
Id. at 1770.
Id.
Id. at 1779 (quoting Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553, 620–21 (opinion of Costa, J.)).
Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1779 (internal quote omitted, emphasis added).
Id.
Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

460

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 15:449

a statute impermissibly restricts the removal of an official, “any harm resulting
from actions taken under” that official may be “attributable to a constitutional
violation.” 112 Thus, the question the Court considered when evaluating the
available remedy was the precise role of the unlawfully appointed official in the
action that caused the injury. 113 For instance, if the shareholders could show that
“the President might have replaced one of the confirmed Directors who
supervised the implementation of” the challenged amendment, or that a
“[d]irector might have altered his behavior in a way that would have benefited
shareholders,” they could be entitled to some relief. 114 Ultimately, for the
standing analysis, because “a decision in the shareholders’ favor could easily
lead to the award of at least some of the relief they seek,” the injury was traceable
and redressable. 115 In sum, future plaintiffs should take care to closely examine
the relationship between the precise relief requested and the injuries claimed and
ensure that they can establish a close connection to support standing.
In contrast to the cases in which the Court did not find standing, it arguably
stretched the limits of Article III to reach the merits in Uzuegbunam v.
Preczewski, which raised a First Amendment claim and focused on
redressability. 116 Two evangelical Christian students at Georgia Gwinnett
College challenged a campus policy restricting distribution of written religious
materials and religious speech to two designated “free expression speech areas”
on campus. 117 They sought injunctive relief and nominal damages. 118 The
college abolished the policy during the litigation and moved to dismiss the suit
as moot. 119 The students conceded that injunctive relief was no longer available,
but contended that their claim for nominal damages kept the suit alive. 120 The
District Court disagreed, dismissing the suit, and the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed. 121
The Supreme Court reversed, holding a claim for nominal damages alone
satisfied Article III’s standing requirements. 122 The case focused on whether
nominal damages were capable of redressing a past injury—the third Article III
factor. 123 The majority held that “nominal damages provide the necessary
redress for a completed violation of a legal right[,]” which the plaintiffs in this

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 1781.
Id. at 1762.
Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1789.
Id. at 1779.
Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792, 797 (2021).
Id. at 796–97.
Id. at 797.
Id.
Id.
Uzuegbunam, 141 S. Ct. at 797.
Id. at 802.
Id. at 797–98.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2022]

ACCESS TO COURT CASES FROM THE SUPREME COURT’S 2020–2021 TERM

461

case suffered. 124 While “a single dollar often cannot provide full redress, . . . the
ability to effectuate a partial remedy satisfies the redressability requirement.” 125
In a sarcastic dissent, Chief Justice Roberts found “just a few problems”
with the challenge—the restrictions no longer exist, the students no longer attend
the college, and they never alleged actual damages. 126 He rejected the premise
that nominal damages redress harm, raising the specter of courts issuing advisory
opinions whenever nominal damages are alleged, thus “turning judges into
advice columnists.” 127 He further noted, that the Court did not reach the issue of
whether a defendant should be able to end a case by giving the plaintiff the
nominal damages requested, though “our cases have long suggested that he
can.” 128 “The scope of our jurisdiction should not depend on whether the
defendant decides to fork over a buck.” 129
III. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
When there are questions about what a law means, people look to the courts.
The courts, in turn, use rules of statutory construction to decide what the law
means. Not surprisingly, this past term, the Supreme Court issued a number of
opinions that apply these rules of construction. 130 A few themes emerged.
First, the Court resolved a number of statutory interpretation questions by
emphasizing the importance of a statute’s structure and context, not just a plain
reading of the text’s words. Second, as in recent years, the Court established the
meaning of contested words or phrases by looking to how those terms were
understood at the time Congress enacted the statute. Legislative history played
a secondary role when the Court was discerning a statute’s meaning. Instead,
some justices factored in what they imagined Congress would have considered
important when drafting a statute in a particular way. To put it another way,
rather than cite evidence from Congress, these justices relied on their own
speculations. And, third, borrowing words from the Honorable Judge Gladys
Kessler, the Court recognized that, in addition to “the dry and bloodless language
of the law,” these cases “are about people.” 131 In multiple cases, Justice

124. Id. at 802 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
125. Id. at 801 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
126. Uzuegbunam, 141 S. Ct. at 802
127. Id. at 803, 804.
128. Id. at 808.
129. Id.
130. Trump, 141 S. Ct. at 542; Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1482, 1486 (2021);
Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754, 768, 773 (2021); Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct.
2271, 2286, 2289 (2021); California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104, 2109, 2120 (2021); TransUnion
LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2204 (2021); Territory of Guam v. United States, 141 S. Ct.
1608, 1615 (2021).
131. Salazar v. Salazar v. District of Columbia, 954 F. Supp. 278, 281 (D.D.C. 1996).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

462

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 15:449

Sotomayor pointed out how the Court’s construction of a statute would have
particular impact on low-income people and people of color. 132
The Court’s statutory interpretation cases, of course, consistently started
with the text of the statute. But the Court often placed significant emphasis on
the “context” or “structure” of a statute to determine its meaning. For instance,
in Niz-Chavez v. Garland, the Court considered whether a requirement by the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)
to send an immigrant “a notice to appear” requires a single, comprehensive
notice with all the required information, or whether that information could be
supplied through multiple notices sent at different times. 133 The Court concluded
that the statute requires a single, comprehensive notice. 134
Justice Gorsuch, writing for the Court, started by noting the text’s use of the
singular article “a.” 135 But despite this straightforward interpretation, the Court
did not stop there. Acknowledging that sometimes “a” can refer to items
provided in installments, the Court emphasized that “context matters.” 136 Here,
the Court found the use of “a” important because, while notice can refer either
to “a countable object (‘a notice,’ ‘three notices’ or a noncountable abstraction
(‘sufficient notice,’ ‘proper notice’),” the use of the singular in IIRIRA suggests
that Congress intended notice to refer to countable objects. 137 Without evidence
to suggest Congress intended some technical or other non-ordinary meaning, the
Court stressed that customary and ordinary usage should govern. 138
The next “contextual clue” the Court reviewed was the similarity between
“a notice to appear” and other case-initiating pleadings. 139 The Court reasoned
that the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure that Congress adopted
similarly use “the indefinite article to refer to a single document” that initiates
legal proceedings, such as a complaint or indictment. 140
Still not satisfied, the Court continued on to analyze the “structure and
history” of the statute. 141 It reviewed several other related statutory provisions
which referred to “the” notice to appear, which underscored that Congress
intended the notice to be a single document. 142 Finally, the Court relied on the
history of the statute, noting that a prior version allowed the government to

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Pereida, 141 S. Ct. at 767; Johnson, 141 S. Ct. at 2293.
Niz-Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 1478.
Id. at 1486.
Id. at 1481.
Id.
Id.
Niz-Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 1481–82.
Id. at 1482.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1482–83.
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provide the necessary information in the written document “or otherwise.” 143
The Court’s interpretation gave meaning to this change: now, the required
information must be in “a notice to appear” and not provided “otherwise.” 144
The Court did not go so far as to cite legislative history, but did reason that “[a]
rational Congress easily could have thought that measuring an [immigrant]’s
period of residence against the service date of a discrete document was
preferable to trying to measure it against a constellation of moving pieces.” 145
The Court followed a similar pattern of review in Tanzin v. Tanvir. 146 This
case arose after FBI agents placed Muhammad Tanvir and other practicing
Muslims on a No Fly List. 147 Mr. Tanvir and the others sued, alleging that the
agents violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) by
placing them on the No Fly List because they had refused to be informants
against their religious communities. 148 The complaint sued the agents in their
official capacities for injunctive relief and in their individual capacities for
money damages. 149 The Department of Homeland Security subsequently
removed Mr. Tanvir and the others from the No Fly List. 150 The case for
damages continued, however, making its way to the Supreme Court. 151 Using
rules of construction, the Court unanimously held that relief for violations of
RFRA includes claims for money damages against government officials in their
individual capacities. 152
RFRA authorizes individuals to “obtain appropriate relief against a
government.” 153 The Government argued that this phrase should be limited to
suits against individuals in their official capacity as a government actor. 154 The
Court pointed out that “[t]he problem with this otherwise plausible argument is
143. Niz-Chavez, 141 S. Ct. 1484.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1484. A majority of the Court decided against noncitizens in other cases involving
statutory interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act. See Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S.
Ct. 754, 761 (2021) (applying rules of construction to conclude that Immigration and Nationality
Act provisions place the burden of proof on the noncitizen to prove they have not been convicted
of disqualifying crimes, including crimes of moral turpitude); Johnson v. Guzman, 141 S. Ct. 2271,
2280, 2291 (2021) (applying rules of construction to conclude that Immigration and Nationality
Act provisions categorically deny bond hearings to noncitizens who are detained after reentering
the U.S. and are now challenging their removal based on a reasonable fear of persecution or torture).
Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan dissented in both cases.
146. Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 493 (2020) (showing a similar analysis using rules of
construction).
147. Id. at 489.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Tanzin, 141 S. Ct. at 489.
152. Id. at 493, aff’g, 894 F.3d 449 (2d Cir. 2018).
153. Id. at 489 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c)).
154. Id. at 490.
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that Congress supplanted the ordinary meaning of ‘government’ with a different,
express definition.” 155 RFRA defines “government” to include “a branch,
department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under
color of law) of the United States.” 156 And, “[w]hen a statute includes an explicit
definition, we must follow that definition, even if it varies from a term’s ordinary
meaning. . . .” 157
The opinion also assessed the “legal backdrop” against which Congress
enacted RFRA. 158 Another civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, applies to
“person[s] . . . under color of any statute” and has long been interpreted to allow
suits against government officials in their individual capacities. 159 Writing for
the Court, Justice Thomas reasoned, “Because RFRA uses the same terminology
as § 1983 in the very same field of civil rights law, ‘it is reasonable to believe
that the terminology bears a consistent meaning.’” 160
The Court then parsed the meaning of “appropriate relief” under RFRA. 161
Lacking a statutory definition, the Court sought out “the phrase’s plain meaning
at the time of enactment.” 162 Dictionaries of the time defined the word similarly
as meaning “especially suitable”—an open-ended definition that the Court
recognized would be “inherently context dependent.” 163 Justice Thomas noted
that damages were awarded against government officials “[i]n the early
Republic.” 164 He then said RFRA was passed to “counter” the Court’s decision
in Employment Division v. Smith, 165 and make clear that the Government must
155. Id.
156. Tanzin, 141 S. Ct. at 489 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–2(1) (emphasis in original).
157. Id. at 490 (internal quotations omitted). In Van Buren v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1648
(2021), both the six-member majority and the three dissenting justices relied on many of the same
sources to reach opposite conclusions. For example, both cited A. Scalia & B. Garner, READING
LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS, and both sides cited Tanzin. Van Buren, 141 S. Ct.
at 1657, 1663. The justices also engaged in a dictionary face-off, with the majority citing from eight
dictionaries, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY, COMPUTER
DICTIONARY AND HANDBOOK, BARNHART DICTIONARY OF NEW ENGLISH, MICROSOFT
COMPUTER DICTIONARY, and A DICTIONARY OF COMPUTING, id. at 1654–58, and the dissent, from
two, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY AND BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, id. at 1663
(Thomas, J., Roberts, C.J., Alito, J., dissenting).
158. Tanzin, 141 S. Ct. at 490.
159. Id. at 490 (citing Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305–06, and n. 8
(1986)).
160. Id. at 490–91(citing A. SCALIA & B. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 323 (2012) (internal quotations omitted).
161. Id. at 491.
162. Id.
163. Tanzin, 141 S. Ct. at 491.
164. Id. (citation omitted).
165. Id. at 489 (citing Emp. Div., Dept. of Hum. Res. of Or. V. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885–90
(1990)) (“[T]he First Amendment tolerates neutral, generally applicable laws that burden or
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have a “compelling interest” when its actions “substantially burden” a person’s
exercise of religion. 166 Because RFRA had reinstated the pre-Smith protections,
it stood to reason that persons suing under RFRA “must have at least the same
avenues for relief against officials that they would have had before Smith. That
means RFRA provides, as one avenue for relief, a right to seek damages against
Government employees.” 167 Justice Thomas concluded:
Our task is simply to interpret the law as an ordinary person would. Although
background presumptions can inform the understanding of a word or phrase,
those presumptions must exist at the time of enactment. We cannot manufacture
a new presumption now and retroactively impose it on a Congress that acted 27
years ago. 168

Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid applied the same—and many other—rules of
construction. 169 In fact, Facebook offers a mini-treatise on these rules. 170 The
case was sparked by an optional Facebook security feature that sends text alerts
when an unknown device attempts to access the user’s Facebook account. 171
Noah Duguid received the alerts even though he had not opted into the
service. 172 Unable to stop them, he filed a lawsuit alleging that Facebook was
violating a provision of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) that
prohibits the use of autodialer systems. 173 The TCPA defines an autodialer as:
prohibit religious acts even when the laws are unsupported by a narrowly tailored, compelling
governmental interest[.]”). For additional discussion of Smith, see infra Section IV.B.1 and
accompanying notes.
166. Tanzin, 141 S. Ct. at 489 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1)–(2)).
167. Id. at 492.
168. Id. at 493. Justice Thomas and three other Justices took the opportunity in two nonmajority opinions to reiterate their belief in cabining statutory interpretation to the time of
enactment, particularly when considering how statutes relate to common law. In Nestlé USA, Inc.
v. Doe, the Court addressed what torts may be brought under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). Nestlé
USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931, 1941 (2021). While the ATS creates jurisdiction for “torts . . .
in violation of the law of nations,” Justices Gorsuch, Thomas, and Kavanaugh wrote separately to
emphasize that they would limit the available torts to three that were recognized as violations of
international law at the time the ATS was enacted in 1789, regardless of how international law
develops over time. Id. at 1941–42 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). In Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic,
Inc., Justice Barret, writing for the dissent, rejected the application of the canon that Congress
legislates against a backdrop of common-law principles. Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc.,
141 S. Ct. 2298, 2314 (2021). In her view, Congress cannot ratify common-law principles unless
the principles are “well-settled” when the statute is enacted. Id. at 2314–15. Because the doctrine
at issue was introduced only “in the late 19th century,” unlike others which “have been around for
nearly a thousand years,” she reasoned, Congress could not have intended to incorporate the
doctrine. Id. at 2319–20.
169. Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163, 1169 (2021).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1168.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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“[E]quipment which has the capacity—
(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or
sequential number generator; and
(B) to dial such numbers.” 174

The Court had to decide whether the clause “using a random or sequential
number generator” modifies both verbs that precede it (“store” and “produce”)
or only the verb nearest to it (“produce”). 175 Justice Sotomayor’s opinion for the
Court employs numerous rules of construction to decide the question, including:
• Plain text meaning: The Court notes that the clause “hangs together as a
unified whole, . . . using the word ‘or’ to connect two verbs that share a
common direct object, ‘telephone numbers to be called.’” Reading the text
to apply the modifier (“using a random or sequential number generator”)
to just part of the “cohesive preceding clause” would be “odd.” 176
• The commands of punctuation: “A qualifying phrase [“using a random or
sequential number generator”] separated from antecedents [“store or
produce”] by a comma is evidence that the qualifier is supposed to apply
to all the antecedents instead of only to the immediately preceding
one.” 177
• The series-qualifier canon: “‘When there is a straightforward, parallel
construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series,’ a modifier at the
end of the list normally applies to the entire series.” 178 While the Court
agreed that the autodialer definition followed this structure, Justice
Alito’s concurrence notes the limits of this canon: “[C]anons are useful
tools, but it is important to keep their limitations in mind. This may be
especially true with respect to. . . the ‘series-qualifier’ canon.” 179

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Facebook, Inc., 141 S. Ct. at 1169 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1170 (collecting treatises).
Id. at 1169 (collecting cases and citing A. SCALIA & B. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 147 (2012)).
179. Facebook, Inc., 141 S. Ct. at 1173–74 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Perhaps more than most of
the other canons, [the series qualifier canon] is highly sensitive to context. Often the sense of the
matter prevails: He went forth and wept bitterly does not suggest that he went forth bitterly.”)
(internal quotations and citation omitted). Justice Alito provided additional examples, e.g.: “On
Saturday, he relaxes and exercises vigorously.” “When his owner comes home, the dog wags his
tail and barks loudly.” “She likes to swim and run wearing track spikes.” Id. at 1174. See also
Yellen v. Confederated Tribes, 141 S. Ct. 2434, 2448 (2021) (citing J. Alito’s Facebook, Inc.
concurrence and refusing to apply series-qualifier canon); id. at 2454 (Gorsuch, J., Thomas, J., &
Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing Facebook, 141 S. Ct. at 1170, and applying series-qualifier canon,
stating “[a] clause that leaps over its nearest referent to modify every other term would defy
grammatical gravity and common sense alike.”).
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• The rule of the last antecedent: “[A] limiting clause or phrase . . . should
ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it
immediately follows.” The Court refused Duguid’s arguments to use this
canon, finding that it does not apply when, as in this case, the modifying
clause appears after an integrated list. 180 At any rate, application of the
rule did not help Duguid: “The last antecedent before ‘using a random or
sequential number generator’ is not ‘produce,’ as Duguid needs it to be,
but rather ‘telephone numbers to be called.’ There is ‘no grammatical
basis,’ for arbitrarily stretching the modifier back to include ‘produce,’
but not so far back as to include ‘store.’” 181
• The distributive canon: “‘Where a sentence contains several antecedents
and several consequents,’ courts should ‘read them distributively and
apply the words to the subjects which, by context, they seem most
properly to relate.’” 182 The Court also refused to apply this canon noting
that there are two antecedents (store and produce) but only one
consequent modifier (using a random or sequential number generator),
and “‘the distributive canon has the most force when the statute allows
for one-to-one matching.’” 183
• Duguid’s arguments were also rejected because application of the
traditional rules of interpretation did not result in a “‘linguistically
impossible’ or contextually implausible outcome.” 184
• Finally, “statutory context” confirmed the Court’s reasoning. 185 The
TCPA makes it unlawful to use an autodialer to call certain emergency
telephone numbers. 186 “Expanding the definition of an autodialer to
encompass any equipment that merely stores and dials telephone numbers
would take a chainsaw to these nuanced problems when Congress meant
to use a scalpel.” 187
Because Facebook’s alert system did not store or produce telephone numbers
“using a random or sequential number generator,” it was not an autodialer. 188
Mr. Duguid lost his case. 189
180. Facebook, Inc., 141 S. Ct. at 1170 (quoting Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003))
(collecting cases).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1172 (citation omitted).
183. Id. (citing Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1141 (2018)).
184. Id. at 1171 (citing Encino Motorcars, 138 S. Ct. at 1141 and Advoc. Health Care Network
v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652, 1661 (2017)) (“noting that a ‘sense of inconceivability’ might ‘urg[e]
readers to discard usual rules of interpreting text[.]’”).
185. Facebook, Inc., 141 S. Ct. at 1171.
186. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1173.
189. Id.
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In two other cases, the Court considered statutory provisions with
ambiguous references. In each case the parties disputed whether the “natural
referent” of the contested provision was internal to the same statute or
encompassed other applicable law. 190 In each case, the Court emphasized the
statute’s context and structure, unanimously concluding that the natural referents
were internal to the same statute, rejecting broader readings that created
ambiguity the Court concluded Congress would not have intended. 191
In U.S. v. Briggs, the Court applied rules of statutory construction to a statute
of limitation for criminal prosecution under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ). 192 The UCMJ orders the crime of rape to be “punished by
death” and establishes that crimes that are punishable by death can be tried “at
any time without limitation.” 193 Before Briggs committed his crime, the
Supreme Court had decided in Coker v. Georgia that the Eighth Amendment
forbids punishment by death for rape. 194 Thus, Briggs urged that his crime was
not, in fact “punishable” by death under all applicable law. 195 And as a result,
he urged that the UCMJ’s five-year statute of limitation applied. 196
The Court disagreed. 197 While it started, as it usually does, with the text and
dictionary definitions, it found this approach ultimately “shed little light on the
dispute.” 198 Instead, the Court emphasized the rule that “the meaning of a
statement often turns on the context in which it is made,” and ultimately
concluded that in this case “context is determinative.” 199
The context the Court found relevant was that the contested phrase
(“punishable by death”) appeared within a statute of limitations provision within
the UCMJ. 200 First, the Court noted the UCMJ is “uniform,” making the statute
itself the natural referent for the phrase “punishable by death,” rather than all
applicable law. 201 Second, the Court relied on the rule of interpretation that
statutes of limitation should provide clarity and predictability, and thus it is
“reasonable to presume that clarity is an objective for which lawmakers strive
when enacting such provisions.” 202 The Court explained that it had never
decided whether Coker applies to the military, and it rejected the idea that
Congress would enact a statute of limitation provision that relied on “the answer
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

United States v. Briggs, 141 S. Ct. 467, 470 (2020).
Territory of Guam v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1608, 1613 (2021).
Briggs, 141 S. Ct. at 470.
Id. at 469–70.
Id. (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)).
Id. at 470.
Id.
Briggs, 141 S. Ct. at 474.
Id. at 470.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Briggs, 141 S. Ct. at 471.
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to an unresolved constitutional question.” 203 Third, without citing any legislative
history or other authority, the Court hypothesized that “the factors that
lawmakers are likely to take into account when fixing the statute of limitations
for a crime differ significantly from the considerations that underlie [the Court’s]
Eighth Amendment decisions.” 204 Thus, it found it “unlikely” that Congress
intended to tie the statute of limitations to evolving Eighth Amendment
precedents. 205
In Territory of Guam v. United States, the Court addressed the scope of a
provision establishing claims for contribution within the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). 206 It
held that these CERCLA contribution claims can only stem from “CERCLAspecific liability” and not “a broader array of settlements involving
environmental liability.” 207 As in Briggs, it focused heavily on the context of the
provision within the statute as a whole, noting that this approach was reinforced
by the inclusion of the word “Comprehensive” in the title of the statute. 208
Further mirroring the reasoning in Briggs, the Court noted that its interpretation
“has the additional benefit of providing clarity for the three-year statute of
limitations” associated with CERCLA contribution claims. 209 Finally, the Court
found the structure of the statute and location of the contested provision within
that structure sufficiently clear that it rejected application of the rule against
surplusage, noting that the provision was better understood as a “sort of beltand-suspenders approach.” 210
In the last two statutory interpretation cases we discuss, City of Chicago v.
Fulton and Terry v. United States, concurrences from Justice Sotomayor remind
us that real people are affected by the Court’s application of the rules of
construction. 211 In City of Chicago v. Fulton, the respondents had filed Chapter
13 bankruptcy petitions and asked the City to return their vehicles, which had
been impounded for unpaid fines. 212 The City refused. 213 Litigation ensured, and
the appellate court eventually held the City was violating the Bankruptcy
Code. 214 The Supreme Court disagreed. 215
203. Id.
204. Id. at 473.
205. Id.
206. Territory of Guam v. United States, 141 S. Ct. at 1608, 1612 (2021).
207. Id. at 1611.
208. Id. at 1613.
209. Id. at 1614 n.4 (internal quotes omitted).
210. Id. at 1615.
211. City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585, 593 (2021); Terry v. United States, 141 S. Ct.
1858, 1864 (2021).
212. City of Chicago, 141 S. Ct. at 589.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 592.
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Once bankruptcy is declared, section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code
prohibits “any act to obtain possession of property . . . or to exercise control over
property” of the bankruptcy estate. 216 The question before the Court was whether
this provision is violated when an entity simply retains possession of a debtor’s
property. 217
Writing for the Court, Justice Alito first applied a “natural reading” of the
provision’s words, citing Black’s Law Dictionary and Webster’s New
International Dictionary definitions to conclude that engaging in an “act” to
“exercise” power “communicates more than merely ‘having’ that power.” 218
Next, he assessed the statutory context. Another provision, § 542(a), governs
“[t]urnover of property to the estate.” 219 Reading § 362(a)(3) to cover mere
retention of property would make § 542(a) superfluous, thus violating the canon
against surplusage, which “is strongest when an interpretation would render
superfluous another part of the same statutory scheme.’” 220 Finally, the Court
examined the history of the Bankruptcy Code. 221 The provisions under scrutiny
were included in the original Bankruptcy Code; however, § 362(a)(3) only
applied to acts to obtain possession of estate property. 222 The phrase “or to
exercise control over property of the estate” was not added until 1984. 223 The
Court reasoned that transforming § 362 into an affirmative turnover obligation
would have been an important change, “odd for Congress to accomplish . . . by
simply adding the phrase “exercise control. . . . [T]he least one would expect
would be a cross-reference” to § 542(a). 224 Thus, the city could retain possession
of the debtor’s cars. 225
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence points out that the wording of the Code—
and thus the Court’s opinion—particularly disadvantaged low-income people. 226
As she explains, for a Chapter 13 bankruptcy to succeed, a debtor needs to be
able to make a “fresh start,” and a car can be essential to gaining and maintaining
the employment needed to do that. 227 However, with the Bankruptcy Code
reading as it does,

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
2595).
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).
City of Chicago, 141 S. Ct. at 589–90.
Id. at 590.
Id. at 591 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 542).
Id. at 591 (quoting Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 543 (2015)).
Id.
City of Chicago, 141 S. Ct. at 591 (citing Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2570,
Id.
Id. at 592.
Id. at 593.
Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
City of Chicago, 141 S. Ct. at 593 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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[d]rivers in low-income communities across the country face . . . vicious cycles.
A driver is assessed a fine she cannot immediately pay; the balance balloons as
late fees accrue; the local government seizes the driver’s vehicle, adding
impounding and storage fees to the growing debt; and the driver, now without
reliable transportation to and from work, finds it all but impossible to repay her
debt and recover her vehicle. 228

Justice Sotomayor calls on policy makers to take steps to ensure prompt
resolution of debtors’ requests for turnover under § 542(a), especially where
their vehicles are concerned. 229
Terry v. United States, was also based on a plain text approach to reading
this statute, with the Court again citing Black’s Law Dictionary. 230 The Court
rejected Mr. Terry’s bid for resentencing after a federal law had triggered
changes in sentencing guidelines for possession of crack and powder cocaine. 231
Justice Sotomayor again wrote separately to emphasize the consequences of the
Court’s decision:
As enacted in 1986, [the sentencing law, 21 U.S.C.] § 841(b) created a 100-to-1
ratio between the amounts of powder and crack cocaine necessary to trigger the
mandatory minimums[.] . . . Subparagraph (A)’s 10-year minimum was
triggered by 5,000 grams of powder cocaine (about the weight of a gallon of
paint), but only 50 grams of crack cocaine (about half a stick of butter).
Subparagraph (B)’s 5-year minimum required 500 grams of powder (heavier
than a football) but just five grams of crack (the weight of a nickel). 232

She noted that these sentencing laws have resulted in crack cocaine sentences
that are about fifty percent longer than those for powder cocaine. 233 The
concurrence continued:
Black people bore the brunt of this disparity. Around 80 to 90 percent of those
convicted of crack offenses between 1992 and 2006 were Black, while Black
people made up only around 30 percent of powder cocaine offenders in those
same years. 234

Justice Sotomayor again asked Congress to address the disparity. 235

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. at 595 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Terry v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1858, 1862 (2021).
Id. 1861–62.
Id. at 1865 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
Terry, 141 S. Ct. 1858 at 1868 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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IV. FIRST AMENDMENT CASES
A.

Challenges to COVID Restrictions

The Court heard an unusual number of cases this term involving First
Amendment claims, including several challenges to state COVID restrictions.
These built off a case from last term’s shadow docket, South Bay United
Pentecostal Church v. Newsom (“South Bay I”), where a per curiam opinion
denied injunctive relief to a church that challenged California’s stay-at-home
order limiting attendance at places of worship. 236 In that case, Justice Roberts
wrote a separate concurrence noting that “[t]he precise question of when
restrictions on particular social activities should be lifted during the pandemic is
a dynamic and fact-intensive matter subject to reasonable disagreement,” but
emphasized that latitude was owed public health officials when they “act in areas
fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties.” 237 Justices Kavanaugh,
Thomas, and Gorsuch dissented, stating that they would have applied strict
scrutiny to California’s order, and in their view, the state had failed to provide a
“compelling justification” for its limitations on religious activity. 238
The Court initially continued the trend upholding state COVID restrictions
this term, when, in July 2020 in Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, the
Court per curiam denied an injunction challenging a state’s COVID restrictions
as an infringement on First Amendment Free Exercise and Free Speech rights. 239
Justices Kavanaugh, Thomas, and Gorsuch again dissented, this time joined by
Justice Alito. 240 Justice Alito explained his evolving approach:
[A]t the outset of an emergency, it may be appropriate for courts to tolerate very
blunt rules. In general, that is what has happened thus far during the COVID-19
pandemic. But a public health emergency does not give Governors and other
public officials carte blanche to disregard the Constitution for as long as the
medical problem persists. As more medical and scientific evidence becomes
available, and as States have time to craft policies in light of that evidence, courts
should expect policies that more carefully account for constitutional rights. 241

By November 2020, the tide began to turn. Roman Catholic Diocese of
Brooklyn v. Cuomo was a per curiam decision addressing a consolidated set of
cases by religious organizations against the State of New York, challenging the
Governor’s Executive Order on COVID restrictions, which limited in-person
236. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom (South Bay I), 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613–14
(2020).
237. Id. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (quoting Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417,
427 (1974)).
238. Id. at 1614–15 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
239. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2603, 2605 (2020).
240. Id. at 2603 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 2609 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); id. (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting).
241. Id. at 2605 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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attendance at religious services in areas where the risk of transmission was
deemed especially high. 242 The Court found that the Executive Order’s
provisions “cannot be viewed as neutral because they single out houses of
worship for especially harsh treatment.” 243 As such, the Court applied strict
scrutiny review and determined that “[s]temming the spread of COVID–19 is
unquestionably a compelling interest” but that New York’s Executive Order was
“far more restrictive than any COVID–related regulations that have previously
come before the Court, much tighter than those adopted by many other
jurisdictions hard-hit by the pandemic, and far more severe than has been shown
to be required to prevent the spread of the virus at the applicants’ services,” such
that it likely violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 244 The
Chief Justice dissented. 245 Justice Breyer also wrote a dissenting opinion, joined
by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, emphasizing that an injunction is an
“extraordinary remedy” not warranted in the case. 246 Justice Sotomayor also
penned a dissent, joined by Justice Kagan, taking issue with the Court’s decision
to treat the New York Executive Order as singling out houses of worship, since
the Order did so in order to treat them more preferentially. 247
A few months later, in South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom
(“South Bay II”), the Court, in a short and non-detailed per curiam opinion,
issued a partial injunction against California’s COVID restrictions on indoor
services in houses of worship, which included a twenty-five percent capacity
limitation on indoor worship services in counties with the highest numbers of
COVID cases, and a prohibition on chanting and singing during indoor worship
services. 248 While the opinion itself is only one paragraph, it spawned several
pages of signed responses by the Justices. 249 Justice Alito stated he would have
granted the injunction with a stay to lift after thirty days “unless the State
demonstrates clearly that nothing short of those measures will reduce the
community spread of COVID–19 at indoor religious gatherings to the same

242. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 65–66 (2020).
243. Id. at 66.
244. Id. at 67 (internal citation omitted). The Court also found that although areas where the
religious organizations held their services had been reclassified since the litigation commenced
such that they were no longer subject to the restrictions at issue, reclassification did not render the
case moot, because the governor frequently reclassified areas with little notice. Id. at 68. The Chief
Justice dissented on this point, stating that he found the injunctions unnecessary, given that none
of the religious entities involved in the lawsuit were currently subject to restrictions. Id. at 75
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
245. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 75 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 77 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 428 (2009)).
247. Id. at 80 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
248. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom (South Bay II), 141 S. Ct. 716, 716 (2021).
249. Id. at 716–23.
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extent as do the restrictions the State enforces with respect to other activities it
classifies as essential.” 250
The Chief Justice issued a concurring opinion, emphasizing that while
federal courts should give great deference to public health officials, the
determination by California public health officials “that the maximum number
of adherents who can safely worship in the most cavernous cathedral is zero …
appears to reflect not expertise or discretion, but instead insufficient appreciation
or consideration of the interests at stake.” 251 Several justices commented
specifically on California’s ban on singing. Justice Barrett wrote a partial
concurrence, joined by Justice Kavanaugh, expressing doubt that California had
adequately carried its burden to show that its ban on singing in houses of worship
was narrowly tailored. 252 Justice Gorsuch issued a statement, joined by Justices
Thomas and Alito, expressing that California’s restrictions “fail strict scrutiny
and violate the Constitution.” 253 Justice Gorsuch took issue with the Court’s
denial of an injunction on California’s ban on singing at worship services, noting
that the state had issued an exemption on the singing ban for the entertainment
industry. 254 Finally, Justice Kagan dissented, joined by Justices Breyer and
Sotomayor, expressing belief that California’s law did not treat houses of
worship differently than similarly situated secular activities, and thus should
pass constitutional muster in light of the public health concerns at stake, stating:
“In forcing California to ignore its experts’ scientific findings, the Court impairs
the State’s effort to address a public health emergency.” 255
Subsequently, in Tandon v. Newsom, the Court per curiam granted an
application for an injunction preventing the State of California from enforcing
its guidance for allowable activities during the COVID-19 pandemic against
plaintiffs who wished to gather for at-home religious exercise. 256 Following
Cuomo, the Court held that California’s “regulations are not neutral and
generally applicable, and therefore trigger strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise
Clause,” because they contained numerous exceptions and exemptions, some
specific to houses of worship. 257 The Court emphasized that California had the
burden of showing that its regulations satisfied strict scrutiny, which required
“show[ing] that measures less restrictive of the First Amendment activity could
not address its interest in reducing the spread of COVID,” and held that
California was unlikely to meet its burden. 258 Finally, the Court held that the fact
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id. at 716 (statement of J. Alito).
Id. at 717 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
Id. (Barrett, J., concurring in part).
South Bay II, 141 S. Ct at 719 (Statement of J. Gorsuch).
Id. at 719–20 (Statement of J. Gorsuch).
Id. at 722–23 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2021).
Id. (citing Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67–68 (2020)).
Id. at 1296–97.
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that California had already modified the regulation at issue did not render the
case moot, since the State could easily impose the same restrictions again. 259
The Court noted sharply that this case represented the fifth time that it had
overturned the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to enjoin California’s COVID restrictions
on religious exercise, and reminded the Ninth Circuit that strict scrutiny “really
means what it says.” 260 Justice Kagan dissented in an opinion joined by Justices
Breyer and Sotomayor, writing that the majority “disregard[ed] law and facts
alike” since California’s regulations treated religious and secular conduct
equally, consistent with the First Amendment, and the factual record supported
California’s contention that at-home religious gatherings posed a greater public
health risk than the commercial activity it allowed. 261
Taken together, this line of cases suggests that by November 2020, the
Court’s conservative bloc—Justices Alito, Barrett, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and
Thomas—agreed that most state COVID restrictions that specifically limit
religious activity are subject to strict scrutiny and violate the Constitution. 262 It
appears Justices Alito and Barrett were more willing to defer to states’ judgment
in the early months of the pandemic, but now agree with the other conservative
Justices that states must narrowly tailor their limitations to survive a First
Amendment challenge—and it is not clear whether the Court will find any
limitation that restricts religious activity narrowly tailored. 263 The Chief Justice
seems to consider these cases on more of a case-by-case basis and tends to defer
to the judgment of state health officials as to what restrictions are necessary at
various stages of the pandemic. 264 The Court’s liberal Justices—Breyer, Kagan,
and Sotomayor—disagree that strict scrutiny is the correct standard for review
in most of these cases, finding most state restrictions do not single out religious
activity and treat it more restrictively. 265 Given the ongoing pandemic and state
attempts to impose restrictions to minimize infection and serious disease, we can
expect that the Court will continue to revisit these questions and develop its First
Amendment jurisprudence in this context in the next term.

259. Id. at 1297.
260. Id. at 1297–98 (citations omitted).
261. Tandon, 141 S. Ct. at 1299 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 1298; S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom (South Bay II), 141 S. Ct. 716,
718 (2021); Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 70.
263. See, e.g., Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2605 (2020) (Alito,
J., dissenting); South Bay II, 141 S. Ct. at 717 (Barrett, J., concurring in part).
264. South Bay I, 140 S. Ct. at 1613; Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 75;
South Bay II, 141 S. Ct. at 717–18 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
265. See, e.g., Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 80 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting); Tandon, 141 S. Ct. at 1299 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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Other First Amendment Cases

The Court’s disagreements about the correct standard of review for First
Amendment challenges also arose in other First Amendment cases this term. For
example, Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta was a set of
consolidated cases bought by two California charities against the State of
California. 266 The charities challenged a California regulation requiring
charitable organizations to disclose the identities of their major donors to the
State Attorney General’s Office by filing with the Attorney General an
attachment to their federal tax filings. 267 The regulation also required charities
to register with the Attorney General and renew their registrations annually. 268
Both organizations refused to provide information about their major donors, and
in 2012 and 2013, the Attorney General threatened to stop renewing their
registrations and levy fines against them. 269
The organizations sued, claiming that the regulation facially and as applied
to their organizations violated the First Amendment Free Association rights and
those of their major donors. 270 A six-member majority of the Court, in an
opinion written by the Chief Justice, held that the California regulation was
unconstitutional. 271 The Chief Justice, however, was not able to garner a
majority as to the appropriate standard of review for claims of First Amendment
violations involving government disclosure regimes; the plurality (Roberts,
Kavanaugh, and Barrett) affirmed that the standard of review is one of “exacting
scrutiny,” which evaluates whether “the strength of the governmental interest
. . . reflect[s] the seriousness of the actual burden on First Amendment rights.” 272
For such cases, the plurality asserted that this standard requires “that disclosure
regimes . . . be narrowly tailored to the government’s asserted interest.” 273
Justices Thomas, while agreeing that the California regulation constituted a
First Amendment violation, explained in his concurring opinion that he
disagreed with the plurality’s formulation of the test, noting that “the bulk of
‘our precedents . . . require application of strict scrutiny to laws that compel
disclosure of protected First Amendment association.’” 274 Justices Alito and
Gorsuch, however, refused to weigh in on the question of the standard that
should apply in these cases, noting that “the choice between exacting and strict
scrutiny has no effect on the decision in these cases,” thus finding “no need to
266. Americans for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2379 (2021).
267. Id. at 2379–80.
268. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 301 (2021).
269. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. at 2380.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 2385, 2389.
272. Id. at 2383 (quoting Doe v. Reed, 561 U. S. 186, 196 (2010)).
273. Id.
274. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. at 2390 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Doe, 561 U. S. at 232 (2010)
(Thomas, J., dissenting)).
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decide which standard should be applied here or whether the same level of
scrutiny should apply in all cases in which the compelled disclosure of
associations is challenged under the First Amendment.” 275 Future cases will
determine what standard is applied in cases challenging government disclosure
rules on First Amendment grounds.
In Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, the state stopped referring
youth to Catholic Social Services, a foster care agency, because it would not
certify same-sex couples due to its religious beliefs. 276 The resolution of this
case turned on the question of whether the City’s policy could be designated as
neutral and generally applicable or whether it specifically burdened religious
exercise, invoking a long standing question in First Amendment Free Exercise
cases. 277 The City found that Catholic Social Services’ refusal to certify samesex couples violated the agency’s contract with the City and a City nondiscrimination ordinance. 278 Catholic Social Services and three foster families
challenged the City’s refusal as violations of the Free Exercise and Free Speech
Clauses of the First Amendment. 279 A six-member majority found that the City
violated the Free Exercise Clause and all justices concurred in the judgment. 280
The majority found that the City’s contract allowed it to consider, on a-case-bycase basis, whether a foster agency that refused to certify same-sex couples
could be granted an exception, such that the City would continue to refer foster
families to the agency. 281 As such, “[t]he contractual non-discrimination
requirement imposes a burden on [Catholic Social Services’] religious exercise
and does not qualify as generally applicable,” and the City’s actions were subject
to strict scrutiny. 282
The majority then held that City’s interests in “[m]aximizing the number of
foster families and minimizing liability are important goals, but the City fails to
show that granting [Catholic Social Services] an exception will put those goals
at risk.” 283 Thus, the majority held that the City’s refusal to accommodate
Catholic Social Services’ religious beliefs failed to satisfy strict scrutiny, and
violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 284
Justice Barrett, joined by Justices Kavanaugh and Breyer, concurred in the
judgment, pointing out that the petitioners, amici, and their colleagues argued
that the Court ought to use this case to overrule Employment Division v. Smith,
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id. at 2392 (Alito, J., concurring).
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1883 (2021).
Id. at 1876.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1882.
Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1880.
Id. at 1881.
Id. at 1881–82.
Id. at 1882.
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494 U.S. 872 (1990). 285 In that case, the Court held that “a neutral, generally
applicable regulatory law that compelled activity forbidden by an individual’s
religion” did not typically violate the Free Exercise Clause. 286 Justice Barrett
opined that it was not necessary for the Court to address whether Smith should
be overruled, since the policy at issue in this case was not neutral and generally
applicable. 287
Justice Alito wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Thomas and
Gorsuch, expressing the opposite view: that Smith should be overturned. 288
Justice Gorsuch also wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Thomas and
Alito, emphasizing his opinion that the Court should have addressed Smith in
this case and overturned it. 289 Justice Alito suggested that the standard set forth
in Smith be replaced by the following test: “A law that imposes a substantial
burden on religious exercise can be sustained only if it is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling government interest.” 290 Justice Gorsuch suggested that the
majority’s “[d]odging the question [of whether to overrule Smith] today
guarantees it will recur tomorrow.” 291 But for the time being, at least, the
standard of review for “a neutral, generally applicable regulatory law that
compelled activity forbidden by an individual’s religion” remains a generous
one that will usually find that such laws do not violate the Free Exercise
Clause. 292
In short, the Court seems to have profound disagreement over the standard
of review for First Amendment cases. Does the same standard apply in
government disclosure cases as other First Amendment cases (and what is the
practical difference between “exacting scrutiny” and “strict scrutiny”
anyway)? 293 Are laws that treat religious conduct more favorably than secular
conduct nevertheless subject to strict scrutiny, since they discriminate between
religious and secular activities? 294 Does it even matter for the purposes of
reviewing an alleged First Amendment violation, whether a the challenged rule

285. Id. (Barrett, J., concurring).
286. Emp. Div. Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 880 (1989).
287. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1882–83 (Barrett, J., concurring).
288. Id. at 1888 (Barrett, J., concurring).
289. Id. at 1931 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
290. Id. at 1924 (Alito, J., concurring).
291. Id. at 1931 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
292. Emp. Div. Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 880 (1989).
293. Compare Americans for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2383 (plurality
opinion), and id. at 2391 (Alito, J., concurring), with id. at 2390 (Thomas, J. concurring).
294. See Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 80 (2020) (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting) (laws that treat religious activity preferentially should not be subject to strict
scrutiny).
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is “neutral[ and] generally applicable”? 295 The Court will undoubtedly have the
opportunity to revisit these questions in the future, and it seems likely that its
First Amendment jurisprudence will continue to evolve.
V. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT CASES
Administrative agencies issue thousands of rules and make thousands of
decisions affecting the rights of millions of people. While the actions of the
agencies undoubtedly often seem remote and obscure, the public has a right to
submit comments to the issuing agency when it promulgates a rule and it must
consider that record of comments when finalizing it. 296 One of this term’s cases
demonstrates how important that record can be when a rule is challenged.
Federal Communications Commission v. Prometheus Radio Project considered
whether a reversal of policy made by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) violated the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). 297
This case has been going on for more than seventeen years with the parties
taking four trips to the Third Circuit. 298 During a periodic review of media
ownership rules, the FCC concluded that three of its rules were no longer
necessary to promote competition, localism, and viewpoint diversity. 299 It also
decided that the administrative record did not indicate that repealing or
modifying the rules would harm minority and female ownership. 300 A number
of consumer groups sued, arguing that the FCC’s decision was arbitrary and
capricious and not supported by the record. 301 The Third Circuit agreed,
remanding to the FCC to review record evidence of the impact on female and
minority ownership “whether through new empirical research or an in-depth
theoretical analysis.” 302
A unanimous Court reversed, holding that the FCC’s decision was not
arbitrary and capricious and did not violate the APA. 303 The Court engaged in a
“deferential” review to determine only whether the agency acted within a “zone
of reasonableness.” 304 Though the record on minority and female ownership was

295. Smith, 494 U.S. at 880; Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1883 (2021) (Alito,
J., concurring). First Amendment challenges should be reviewed under strict scrutiny, regardless
of whether the challenged provision is neutral or treats First Amendment activity differently. Id.
296. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
297. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Prometheus Radio Project, 141 S. Ct. 1150, 1154–55 (2021).
298. Justin Hurwitz, Returning to Agency Deference in Communications Law, REG. REV. (July
21, 2020), https://www.theregreview.org/2021/07/21/hurwitz-returning-to-agency-deference-incommunications-law/.
299. Prometheus Radio Project, 141 S. Ct. at 1154.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 1155.
302. Id. at 1157 (citing 939 F.3d 567, 587 (3d Cir. 2019).
303. Id. at 1158.
304. Prometheus Radio Project, 141 S.Ct. at 1158.
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sparse, the Court noted that the FCC had sought data on the issue and received
none. 305 Further, while the plaintiffs asserted that the FCC ignored certain record
evidence, the Court disagreed, finding that the FCC “simply interpreted [it]
differently.” 306 Finally, while the Court acknowledged that the record evidence
was far from perfect, “the APA imposes no general obligation on agencies to
conduct or commission their own empirical or statistical studies.” 307
VI. APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE CASES
This term, the Court continued to develop its jurisprudence on when the
appointment of executive officials runs afoul of the Appointments Clause of
Article II. Appointment Clause challenges are becoming more common,
providing an additional vehicle to challenge government action beyond the
APA. 308 The Court this term continued to clarify the requirements for
appointment of various executive officials, and addressed whether a challenge
to appointment must be first raised in the administrative proceeding. 309 But the
Court remains fundamentally divided regarding what remedy is appropriate in
cases where a plaintiff is harmed by an action taken by an improperly appointed
official. 310
In U.S. v. Arthrex, Inc., the Court considered whether administrative patent
judges sitting on the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, a tribunal within the Patent
and Trademark Office, were appropriately appointed. 311 The Chief Justice wrote
for the majority to affirm that, under the Appointments Clause, the President
alone, acting with the advice and consent of the Senate, could appoint “principle
officers” within the Executive Branch, but that Congress could vest the
appointment of “inferior officers” to Heads of Departments. 312 Thus, the Court
considered whether the role and duties of administrative patent judges, who are
appointed by the Secretary of Commerce, not the President, and do not undergo
Senate confirmation, was consistent with their appointment as “inferior
officers.” 313
The Court found it dispositive that administrative patent judges “have the
‘power to render a final decision on behalf of the United States’ without any
such review by their nominal superior or any other principal officer in the

305. Id. at 1159.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 1160. Justice Thomas concurred and raised a separate issue, disagreeing that the
FCC was even required to consider minority and female ownership. Id. at 1161.
308. See supra Part II (discussion of Collins v. Yellen).
309. See Carr v. Saul, 141 S.Ct. 1352, 1356 (2021).
310. See discussion supra Part II.
311. United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1977 (2021).
312. Id. at 1979 (citing Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 660 (1997)).
313. Id. at 1979–80.
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Executive Branch.” 314 The Court found this arrangement was incompatible the
Appointments clause, which was designed to create a clear line of political
accountability from administrative decisionmakers to the President. 315 The
majority thus held that the administrative patent judges whose decisions were at
issue had not been properly appointed. 316
The Chief Justice was not able to garner a majority in crafting a remedy to
this problem, however. 317 His plurality opinion, joined by Justices Alito, Barrett,
and Kavanaugh, proposed that Patent Trial and Appeal Board administrative
patent judges be reviewable by the director of the Patent and Trademark Office,
a “principal officer.” 318 Justice Gorsuch dissented, stating that the better remedy
would be to “simply decline[] to enforce the statute in the case or controversy at
hand. . . . by identifying the constitutional violation, explaining our reasoning,
and ‘setting aside’ the [Patent Trial and Appeal Board] decision in this case.” 319
The Court also considered, in a set of consolidated cases called Carr v. Saul,
whether litigants forfeited their Appointment Clause arguments by failing to
raise them in administrative hearings. 320 In response to a 2018 Court ruling, the
acting commissioner of the Social Security Administration ratified the
appointment of administrative law judges within the Administration, and then
instructed its Appeals Council to vacate pre-ratification decisions and provide
de novo review by a properly appointed administrative law judge only for
claimants who had raised an Appointments Clause question in the administrative
proceedings. 321
Six people who had already concluded their administrative proceedings with
the Social Security Administration before it instructed the Appeals Council to
vacate certain pre-ratification cases, and were pursuing review of the
administrative decisions in federal court, which led to a Circuit split as to
whether claimants forfeited their Appointments Clause claims by failing to raise
them in the administrative process. 322 Justice Sotomayor wrote for the majority
to hold that claimants were not required to exhaust their Appointments Clause
challenges in the administrative proceedings to raise them in federal court. 323
The majority emphasized that while Social Security Administration
proceedings were somewhat adversarial in nature, a factor that weighs in favor
of allowing exhaustion, two other factors weighed against exhaustion: “First, . . .
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

Id. at 1981 (quoting Edmond, 520 U.S. at 665).
Id. at 1982.
Arthrex, 141 S.Ct. at 1985.
Id. at 1988 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1986 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 1990 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
Carr v. Saul, 141 S.Ct. 1352, 1356 (2021).
Id. at 1357.
Id.
Id. at 1362.
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agency adjudications are generally ill suited to address structural constitutional
challenges, which usually fall outside the adjudicators’ areas of technical
expertise;” and “[s]econd, [the] futility exception to exhaustion
requirements.” 324 With respect to futility, the majority emphasized that, shortly
after the Court granted cert in Lucia, the Social Security Administration issued
internal guidance to its administrative law judges, directing them “to
acknowledge any Appointments Clause objections with standardized language
explaining that they ‘did not have the authority to rule on that challenge.’” 325
These cases show that there is less agreement among the Court about what
remedy should be afforded in cases where a court finds that a decision was made
by an improperly appointed official. 326 There is also some dispute about when
someone subject to such an official’s authority must challenge their appointment
in order to preserve the argument for future litigation. 327 Undoubtedly, the Court
will consider these issues further in future cases.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this 2020–21 term, as usual, the Court decided many cases with
implications for individuals’ right of access to the courts. Some of these cases
are unlikely have a broad impact beyond the specific subject matter at issue.
TransUnion, on the other hand, has the potential to significantly restrict court
access for individuals raising claims that a variety of their statutory rights are
being violated. At the same time, the Court showed a marked solicitude towards
individual rights under the Free Exercise clause and RFRA, at the expense of
government interests that may conflict with the assertion of those claims.
The Court’s 2021–22 term promises to be quite different from the preceding
term. It will almost certainly include blockbuster decisions that profoundly
reshape the law. Among other things, the Court recently drastically curtailed the
individual right to abortion. In the ongoing case Whole Woman’s Health v.
Jackson, it declined to stay a Texas law that bans most abortions after six weeks
and authorizes citizens to sue abortion providers and anyone who helps to make
an abortion possible. 328 Moreover, the Court dismissed a number of the

324. Id. at 1360–61 (citations omitted).
325. Carr, 141 S. Ct. at 1361 (citations omitted).
326. Compare United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1977 (2021) (plurality opinion),
with id. at 1990 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
327. Compare Carr, 141 S. Ct. at 1360, with id. at 1362 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (social security proceedings are not adversarial, thus claimants need
not raise Appointments Clause challenges at the administrative level), and id. at 1363 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (claimants generally must exhaust issues
administratively to preserve them for litigation, but these claimants have shown futility such that
they are excused from exhaustion).
328. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 529 (2021).
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defendants, making it less likely that the plaintiffs can obtain complete relief. 329
In late June 2022, the Court overturned Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey in its decision in Dobbs v. Jackson, a
challenge to Mississippi's ban on abortions after fifteen weeks. 330 Finally, on the
basis of its interpretation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Court
stayed OSHA’s employer mandate requiring COVID-19 vaccination or masking
in private workplaces. 331 This decision has drawn comparison to the Supreme
Court’s Lochner era when the Court struck down myriad laws attempting to
protect workers. 332 In sum, advocates for civil and individual rights will almost
certainly face a different—and less hospitable—legal landscape.

329. Id. at 539.
330. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., No. 19–1392, 2022 WL 2276808, at *5 (U.S.
June 24, 2022).
331. Nat’l Fed. of Ind. Businesses v. Dep’t of Labor, 142 S. Ct. 661, 665 (2022).
332. Paul Waldman, The Frightening Philosophy Driving the Supreme Court’s New Vaccine
Mandate Rulings, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2022, 4:47 PM) https://www.washingtonpost.com
/opinions/2022/01/13/frightening-philosophy-supreme-court/.
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